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The optimism of the 1980s about the prospects of integrating the
moderate Islamic movement in the process of democratization has been
undermined by the growing repressive political climate of the 1990s. The
existing autocratic regimes proved to be as resilient and tenacious as
their radical Islamic opponents. Although the acceptance of democracy
by the moderate Islamic movements is the ideal, their participation in
elections in a repressive environment entails severe risks, leading in
extreme cases to the loss of credibility and marginalization. In this paper
past strategies of the moderate Islamic movements in Egypt, Jordan and
Palestine are compared. Taking part in elections is regarded as just one
option, which has not always been the optimal one. Also the internal
structure of the moderate Islamic movement is looked into for its
democratic potential.
Introduction
During the 1980s many experts on the Islamic movements in the Middle
East were cautiously optimistic about the possibilities of integration of the
Islamic movement into the body politic. The acute economic crises and
the ensuing restructuring programs imposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank forced the state to loosen its
grip over the economy and society. As a result, the private economy
expanded and the stranglehold of the bureaucracy loosened. In this
atmosphere political parties were allowed to operate, relatively free
parliamentary elections were held, and civil liberties were increasingly
respected. This process of economic liberalization and political
democratization provided new opportunities for the Islamic movement.
Eventually, it was hoped, the Islamic movement would gain its legitimate
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place in the new balance of political forces. While its more radical wings
would be trimmed, its moderate current would be included into the
parliamentary system, a political process called "integration",1
"mstitutionaKzation",2 "normalization",^ or "incorporation".4
Positive evaluations of the first signs of the retreat of the state were
complemented by changes in political ideology of the moderate Islamic
movement. Whereas in the 1940s the Muslim Brotherhood in its classical
form as an organisation was geared to spreading the call, da'wa,
condemned party politics and the multi-party system as hizbiyya, in the
1980s it accepted the parliamentary system and elections as a legitimate
means of gaining power and establishing a position in society. By
distancing itself explicitly from the radical Islamic movement, the
leadership tried to dispel any lingering suspicions about its own past to
establish an Islamic state by violent means.
The democratic shift in the Islamic movement was reflected in new,
appropriate theoretical constructions. According to Gudrun Krämer, the
core of contemporary Muslim political thought is to check and limit
arbitary personal rule and replace it with the rule of law,' while John
Voll and John Esposito take attempts seriously by modern Islamist
thinkers "to establish authentically Islamic democratic systems." In these
attempts tawkid, unity of God, is given the meaning of the equality of
man before God; khalifa has been interpreted as man's viceregency of
God on earth, enhancing individual responsibility and equality; while
shura, consultation, is regarded as upholding the mutuality and equality
between persons in giving each other advice, rather than the ruler asking
the ruled for advice, as is the case in the traditional interpretation of the
concept.6
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Jordan and Tunesia." In Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in
the Muslim World, éd. Ghassan Salamé, London, 1994 : 200-226.
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to the Early 1990s," eds. Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby The Fundamentalism
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Chicago, 1994: 375.
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with Gehad Auda who states that "[TJhis older view was based on disdaining politics,
seeing the state in the light of a simple and direct relationship between the ruled,
Despite these optimistic views, skepticism among scholars about the
prospects of a democratic transition has not been not dispelled. On the
level of power politics, few experts regard liberalization, let alone
democratization, an easy or an inevitable process. Most argue that the
ruling elite will only implement cosmetic changes and will not lead their
countries to democracy.7
Nor has the ideological embracement of democracy by the Islamic
movement convinced everyone. Referring to the hierarchical organisation
of the Muslim Brotherhood critics doubt the sincerity of the commitment
of the Islamic movement to democracy. Those skeptics who lay stress on
'the spirit of tolerance' as a precondition for democracy see no signs of
promise in the dominant position the Islamic movement has acquired in
civil society. Rather than an indication of its vitality, they regard it as the
end of a long tradition of tolerance in the last safe havens in Egyptian
society.8
In the following pages I will adhere to the less optimistic current in
interpreting the chances of democracy. It is true that in Egypt, Jordan and
Palestine there were reasons for optimism in the 1980s and even in the
1990s. Everywhere civil society was becoming stronger and the state was
forced to draw up a social contract with the political opposition. In Egypt
and Jordan the Muslim Brotherhood even participated in parliamentary
elections, and in Palestine Hamas showed itself at times willing to take
part in the elections for the first Palestinian parliament in January 1996.
In all these cases democratization seemed a first step towards integration
of the Islamic movement.
This trend was, however, reversed. At the time of writing the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Gnds the leaders of its third generation in
jail, its political alliance threatened and its party headquarters closed
down. In Jordan the opposition of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) is
rendered ineffectual in parliament, while in Palestine bomb attacks in
February and March 1996 ended attempts to integrate the Islamic
movement into the emerging Palestinian political structure.
In hindsight the optimism of the 1980s was overblown. Not only was
the state less in retreat at the time than most observers believed and was
the radical violent Islamic movement more tenacious than expected, also
neglecting the differences among Muslims or between Muslims and Copts, and locating
political power in the hands of the ruler." Gehad Aucia (1994) : 386.
' Gudrun Kramer (1994) : 202.
* Mustapha Kamil al-Sayyid, "A Civil Society in Egypt?" In: Civil Society in the
Middle East, ed. A.R. Norton. (1995) : 276-282
the transition within the moderate Islamic wing from spreading the
Islamic call {da'wa) by peaceful means to the acceptance of the multi-
party system and democratic elections as a way of establishing an Islamic
society (hizbiyya) was not a successful one.
It is especially the transition from da'wa to hizbiyya within the
adverse political environment of the 1990s that is problematic. This paper
assumes that a clear and real transition from the one to the other would
be an important step towards democracy in the Middle East. It implies
that the Islamic system or state could be installed by democratic means.
The unconditional acceptance of hizbiyya means that the moderate Islamic
movement accepts a multi-party system, abides by the outcome of
parliamentary elections and is convinced of the necessity of political
compromise. It also implies a rejection of its totalitarian claims that Islam
provides a solution to all secular problems. The practical outcome would
be that politics would become more pragmatic and less ideological.
However, one of the problems has been that this transition has always
been ambivalent - and with reason. Activities geared to spreading the
Islamic call - a gradual transition of the morals of Muslims through
religious education - offers moderates the shelter of institutions as
charitable societies when the state lashes out. It leaves room for
Islamising society while gaining power indirectly through infiltration of
sections of society. Moreover, an ambivalent attitude towards hizbiyya
leaves more room for stressing Islamic moral purity, one of the main
attractions of the Islamic movement. In the repressive political
circumstances of the Middle East retention of this ambivalence is not at
all irrational. On the other hand, it keeps politics in a state of immaturity.
The main argument of this paper is that while a clear acceptance of
hizbiyya is an ideal, participation in the process of democratization/
integration is an option in the strategy of the Islamic movement that does
not necessarily work to its advantage. In Egypt, Jordan and Palestine the
Muslim Brotherhood was in a continuous dilemma whether to choose for
political participation, adopt hizbiyya and expose itself, or continue on
the much safer path of da'wa. The paper will argue that hizbiyya
provides opportunities as well as severe drawbacks. In the most optimistic
scenario it offers the moderate Islamic movement the chance to capture a
parliamentary majority and seize or share power - temporarily; in the
worst case scenario it can lead to self-exposure and provoke the
retaliation of the state. But hizbiyya also poses other pitfalls. It can lead
to cooptation and encapsulation, the smothering and watering down of the
programme of the movement, which is the main purpose of
'democratization' process as far as the ruling elite and the West is
concerned. In all three countries different strategies led to different
results.
The paper wil! also consider the internal democratic structures of the
moderate Islamic movement, as the final proof of hizbiyya. In all three
cases democratic structures hardly existed. In Egypt the establishment of
Hizb al-Wasat, in Jordan the existence of independent Islamists and in
Hamas the continuous clash between 'moderates' and 'hardliners' shows





The present crisis between the state and the Brotherhood, as well the
crisis within the Brotherhood itself, began during the 1970s when the
Brotherhood embarked on its policy of integration. In this period it
coopted a new generation into its ranks, thereby incorporating different
cultural and generational approaches to the way the Islamic movement
should proceed to establish an Islamic society.
The Muslim Brotherhood took a new lease on its life after its leaders
were released from prison at the beginning of the 1970s. Umar Tilmisani,
who had been appointed general guide {murshid 'amm) in 1973, set out on
a new path of cooperation with the state. Both had a common enemy in
the left and had the same goal of controlling the radical Islamic
movement.5 The Brotherhood also received state support in negotiating
with the radical Islamic movements, as was the case during the Zawiyya
al-Hamra riots in Cairo between Copts and Muslims in the summer of
1981, prior to Sadat's assassination.10
Despite these close relations with the authorities, the Brotherhood was
careful to pursue an independent policy. It criticised Sadat for deviating
from the Islamic path by going to Jerusalem in 1977. Due to Sadat's
idiosyncratic policies, tensions with the Brotherhood rose, even to the
extent that during the September 1981 crackdown on the opposition the
whole leadership of the Brotherhood was arrested.11
9Gehad Auda, ( 1994): 385
10 Hamied Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and Political Expediency of Religion,"
Middle East Journal 38 (Summer 1994) : 413
11 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s," Third World Quarterly
Under Mubarak relations with the Brotherhood were normalised again
and a modus vivendi was reached. According to this agreement, the latter
would reject violence, abide by the law, respect the state's need for
political and social stability, and support the government against the
radical Islamic movement.12 In return, the Brotherhood could pursue its
policy of Islamising society. ̂  The Brotherhood was, however, not
officially legalized. Nor did it acquire the right to establish a party or
take part in parliamentary elections, because it was regarded as an
organisation based on religion, and politics and religion could not
officially be mixed. I4
The only means the Brotherhood could pursue its policy of hizbiyya
was through coalitions with recognised parties. The implementation of the
new policy of the Brotherhood began when it formed a coalition with the
New Wafd Party for the elections of 1984. The coalition won 58 seats of
the 390 seats of parliamant, 12 of them occupied by members of the
Brotherhood. The Islamic Alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Islami), which the
Brotherhood formed with the Labour and the Liberal Parties for the
1987 elections, won in total 65 of 450 seats, 35 of them for the Muslim
Brotherhood. As a result, the Brotherhood became the major oppositional
faction.
The adoption by the Brotherhood of hizbiyya was not a smooth
process. Tensions between members of the older generation led to the
bansihment of Salih Abu Ruqaiq, and were compounded by more serious
frictions between the older and younger generations. On this particular
issue the older generations stood opposed to the younger generation,
which saw hizbiyya as a means of reorganizing the Brotherhood and
modernising its ideology. The younger generation believed that hizbiyya
should not only be a tactical move to acquire power, but should be a long
term strategy. In the 1970s most of the leaders of the younger generation
had been active in the Jama'at al-lslamiyya at the universities. One of its
most prominent spokesmen, Isam al-Aryan, had been amir al-'amm of the
Islamic student movement,15 When Tilmasani died in May 1986 and
Muhammad Abu al-Nasr was appointed his successor, Isam al-Aryan
gained a seat in the Maktab al-Irshad, the highest advisory body within
10 (1988) 2 : 645.
12 Gehad Auda (1994): 388.
13 See for a full discussion of the shift to democratic themes in the political thought of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Martin Forstner "Auf dem legalen Weg zur Macht? Zur politischen
Entwicklung der Muslimbraderschaft Ägyptens," Orient 19 (1988) Î : 402-407.
14 Olaf Farschid, "Hizbiya: Die Neuoriendening der Muslimbruderschaft Ägyptens in
den Jahren 1984 Ms 1989." Orient 30 (1989) l : 57
15 Hamied Ansari, (Summer 1994) : 412,
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the Brotherhood.1^
It was during this time that the younger generation also started to
make inroads into Egypt's associational life.17 Especially the elite
associations of the free professions were their focus of attention. Younger
Brotherhood members won 7 of the 25 seats in the elections of the
executive board of the Medical Association when they took part in them
for the first time in 1984, while in 1990 they already gained the majority
of 20 seats. Even more spectacular, they won 45 of the 61 seats on the
executive board of the Engineer's Association during their first elections
in 1987.18 Isam al-'Aryan, who in the 1980s became vice-president of the
Egyptian Medical Doctors' Association, embodied the success of the new
policy of the Brotherhood. Through the associations and civil society the
younger generation hoped to build their own power base from which to
acquire power in parliament, and pursue the policy of kizbiyya, once the
the road for political participation was free.
Uprooting the Brotherhood
In hindsight the elections of Î987 marked the turning point in the
relationship with the state. The Muslim Brotherhood had clearly over-
reached itself. Besides winning a substantial number of seats in parliament
and making inroads in the professional organisations, the Muslim
Brotherhood antagonised the state by turning the Labour Party into an
Islamic party. Relations deteriorated further on account of its support for
Saddam Hussein during the second Gulf War.19 In retaliation, the
Ministry of the Interior began to harass members of the Brotherhood,
especially the younger generation, which constituted the future of the
moderate Islamic movement in Egypt and formed its most active and
vigorous section.20
The background of the abrogation of the tacit agreement was provided
by an all out war of the state against the radical Islamic movement in
1992 and the failure of the policy of coupling the moderate Islamic
movement as a means of taking the wind out of the sails of the radical
movement.2! In the following years 1,500 people died in clashes between
I* "The Muslim Brotherhood is facing its worst internal crisis," al-Wasal, No. 251,18-
11-1996:22.
17 Moheb Zaki, Civil Society & Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994, Cairo, 1994 :
43-45.
18 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (1997) : 122-130.
l' Gehad Auda, "An Uncertain Response; The Islamic Movement in Egypt," In Islamic
Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Kscatori, Chicago, 1991 : 122.
2UO!af Farschid (1989) : 65
21 "Striking at the Islamists," Middle East International, 20 November 1992
the radical Islamic movement and state security forces, while thousands of
members of the Islamic movement were detained in camps. In this
repressive climate the Brotherhood's victory in the elections of the
national Bar Association on 14 September 1992 formed a direct
provocation to the state.22 The demonstration, which the National Bar
Association organised on 17 May 1994 in protest against the death in
police custody of the Islamist lawyer Abd al-Harith Madani, provided the
last straw.23
The year 1995 marked the collapse of the relations between the
Brotherhood and the government. A new, more vigorous minister of
Interior, Hasan al-Alfi, pursued a new policy of persecuting the
Brotherhood and cutting its relations from society and politics. Uprooting
the Brotherhood from its societal and political base was done by three
methods, which constituted a frontal attack on the line of hizbiyya of the
Brotherhood.
The first method consisted of preventing the Brotherhood from taking
part in the parliamentary elections of November 1995. The campaign
against the Brotherhood started in January 1995 when 28 of its members
were arrested, among whom Isam al-Aryan.24 Although nothing
substantial was found to warrant their arrest, their custody was prolonged
during the following months until they were brought before a military
court in September.25 In July another 228 members of the Brotherhood
were arrested, among whom were five previous members of parliament
who intended to run for the next elections, as well as fourteen new
candidates.2* Finally in October, one day before the official
22 "Fundamentalist gains," Middle East International, 25 September 1992
23 '"The Brotherhood' nominates prisoners as candidates for the elections. The prisons
enter the electoral competition," al-Wasat, No. 183, 31 July 1995 : 14-15. According to
al-Wasat Abd al-Harith Madani was the legal expert of the leader of the military of wing
of the al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya.
2^ Although the charges against Isam al-Aryan were probably trumped up, there are
indications that he must have had close relations with more radical groups. According to
Hamied Ansari, Isam al-Aryan was born in the village called Nahia in Imbaba district in
Giza. Also Colonel Abbud al-Zumur, the top-ranking member of the Jihad organisation,
who stood trial for the assassination of President Sadat, came from this village. Al-Aryan
was married to the sister of one of the accused in the attack on the Military Technical
College in 1974. In addition, he had played a mediating role in the Zawiya al-Hamra riots
in summer 1981. The riots there led to the assassination of President Sadat during the
following October. However, Ansari notes that al-Aryan at least at that time, rejected the
concept of takfir. See Hamied Ansari, (1994) : 408-417.
25 "Setback for the Islamic coalition or the destruction of the bridges for the
Brotherhood?" al-Hayat, 19 October 1995.
26 '"The Brotherhood' nominates prisoners as candidates for the elections. The prisons
enter the electoral compeation," al-Wasat, No. 183, 31 July 1995.
announcement of the Brotherhood's candidates for the elections, another
fifteen of its members were arrested, including Mun'im Abd al-Futuh,
vice-president of the Arab Medical Doctor's Association.27
By charging the arrested with "being members of an illegal
organisation which aims to overthrow the system by force and disturb the
social peace," the government played on the lingering fears among the
public of the Brotherhood's "terrorist" past. Intimidatingly, Minister of
Interior, Hasan al-Alfi, said in an interview that "the Muslim
Brotherhood could expect to be outlawed and that its existence was
illegal."28 Despite the grave charges, the mild convictions ranging from
three to five years imprisonment that were handed down a few days
before the elections confirmed the political purpose of the trials. In total
87 of the national and local leaders of the Brotherhood were sentenced to
terms in prison in 1996. Most of them belonged to the younger
generation.29
The second method of cutting the Brotherhood down to size, consisted
of severing it's relations with legal political parties. The state
concentrated firstly on the Islamic Alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Islami), which
the Brotherhood had established with the Labour and the Liberal Parties.
At the end of 1994 the government organized a National Dialogue to rein
in the Labour Party. The attempt failed to split the Labour Party
internally, however. The faction in favor of cooperation with the
Brotherhood, consisting of the brothers Adil Husain (secretary-general)
and Magdi Husain, (editor-in-chief of the party newspaper, al-Sha'b), and
their brother-in-law Hilmi Murad (vice-president of the Party), won the
contest with the leader of the party Ibrahim Shukri.30
During the following phase of repression the Labour Party
consistently supported the Brotherhood. Even though it published a ten
point programme which differed entirely from the programme "Islam is
the Solution" with which it had entered the elections with the
Brotherhood in 1987, it remained faithful to the Islamic Alliance.31
During the elections both political organisations coordinated their
27 "Brotherhood revises its list of candidates for Egyptian parliament," al-Hayai, 11
October 1995.
28 Interview with Hasan al-Alfi, al-Hayat, 28 August 1995.
29 "Extension of custody of leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood after having given
their case to the military tribunal," al-Hayat, 13 May 1996.
30 Wahid Abd al-Majid, "Why did the Islamic Alliance persist in the face of numerous
changes which could have led to a split?" al-Hayat, 30 October 1995; "Three currents
compete for control over Labour Party on the eve of the elections," al-Hayat, 25
November 1995.
31 "Signs pointing to split in the Islamic Alliance," al-Hayal, 5 October 1995.
candidates with each other.32 Even after the disastrous election results, in
which the Muslim Brotherhood won only one seat - by accident - and the
Labour Party none, the Labour party declared it would continue the
Islamic Alliance.33 Only the much smaller and insignificant Liberal Party
abandoned the Alliance.
The reactions of the other political parties were mixed. Whereas the
left-wing Tagammu' Party leader Mtihyi al-Din declared that, "we do not
believe that the Brethren have become democrats. They use democracy to
gain power; once they have it, they will kill us one by one,"34 it was
obvious that a wide political spectrum was against the repression of the
Brotherhood. Among the defense attorneys were Diya al-Din Dawud, a
Nasserist leader, Nu'man Jum'a, the vice-president of the Wafd and Nabil
al-Hilali, a leftist who in principle defends Islamists.55
The third method the state used to crush the Brotherhood was to
isolate it from elite sections of civil society which it had penetrated
during the previous years. Already in March 1993, the government had
issued a law which set a quorum of fifty percent for syndicate elections.
This measure was meant to activate the opposition against the
Brotherhood in the associations.36 However, in its campaign against the
Brotherhood the government believed that things were not moving fast
enough. Therefore, in February the Engineer's Association was put under
police custody on the charge of embezzlement of funds and
maladministration, hi April 1995 its administration was seized and its
central office closed down. 37 In his Labor Day speech Mubarak
ominously warned against using associations for political purposes while
neglecting the duties these organisations were supposed to fulfill for their
members.38 After the elections the intimidation campaign continued. In
January 1996 the Bar Association was taken on by the state.39
32 Interview with Ibrahim Shukri in al-Nayal, 21 November 1995.
33 "Islamic Coalition prepares icself for the elections of the year 2000," al-Hayat, 12
December 1995.
34 Interview with Khalid Muhyi al-Din: "When the Brethren gain power, they will kill
us." al-Hayat, 25 May 1996.
35 "The Brethren before the military court: attack is better than defense," ai-Wasat, No.
191,25 September 1995 :22.
56 Moheb Zaki, (1994) : 49.
37 "Brethren arrested by orders of the public prosecutor," al-Hayat, 17 April 1995.
38 "Mubarak attacks the Muslim Brotherhood and warns against their power over the
professional syndicates," al-Hayat, 1 May 1995.
39 Interview with the president of the Bar Association: "Monopoly of the Brethren reason
for crisis of the Bar Association," al-Hayat, 2 February 1996.
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Islamic democracy: the case of Hizb al-Wasat
Despite the repression, a request for recognition of a new party, called
Hizb al-Wasat, was sent to the Committee for Political Parties (Lajnat
Shu'un al-Ahzab) on 10 January 1996. In itself the request for
recognition was not exceptional. Since 1986 several requests have been
made by the Brotherhood for recognition as an Islamic Party, called
either Hizb al-Shura, Hizb al-Islah or Hizb al-Amal, all of which had been
rejected. New, however, was that the current founders belonged to the
younger generation of the Brotherhood.
From statements made by the founders it was apparent that a revolt of
the 'shabab' (youth) against the 'shuyukh' (the elders) had broken out.
This was confirmed by the social and occupational background of the
leaders of the new party. Its leader, Abu al-Ala Madi, was vice-president
of the Engineer's Association. The other three founders, were Isam
Sultan, a lawyer who had been chosen as president of the Student Union
of the Cairo University in 1986,40 Sallah Abd al-Maqsud a journalist, and
Isam Hashish, an Assistent Professor at the Faculty of Engineering.41 In a
statement Abu al-Ala Madi said that "the youth of our society wants to
express itself."42
The generation gap expressed itself in a break with the traditions of
the Brotherhood. From statements made by Abu al-Ala Madi it was clear
that the younger generation regarded itself as the main victim of the
mistakes made by the Brotherhood."3 By adhering to democratic
principles and taking the final step of becoming an independent political
party the younger generation hoped to continue to play the political role
which it had been playing since it had taken over the elite professional
associations. Democratic structures would also replace the strict discipline
of "listening and obeying" (al-sama'a wa al-ta'a) by which the 'shuyukh'
in the Brotherhood had prevented the 'shabab' from taking their rightful
place.44
Ideologically, the party also represented a shift to a modern political
party. It adopted ideas which had been formulated in the 1980s by
thinkers as Tariq al-Bishri.45 The vagueness of the concept of the turath,
40 See for information on Isara Sultan. "Crisis deepens between Hizb al-Wasat and the
Brethren," al-Hayai, 5 June 1996.
41 Information on Isam Hashish: "Military tribunal begins shortly to investigate the
Brotherhood case," at-Hayat, 24 May 1996.
42 "A new split in the Brotherhood," al-Wasat, No. 208, 22 January 1996: 10-12.
43 "The Muslim Brotherhood is facing its worst internal crisis," al-Wasat, No. 251, 18
November 1996:22.
44 "A new split ta the Brotherhood," al-Wasat, No. 208,22 January 1996:11.
45 See Roei Meijer, "Auöienticity in History. The Concepts al-Wafid and al-Mawrüth b
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the Islamic heritage, on which the ideology of the party was based paved
the way for a new start. Also the fact that a Copt, Rafiq Habib, son of the
head of the Evangelical Church in Egypt, could play an important part in
the party and in the formulation of its ideology was a sign of change.
Rafiq Habib stated that the party was founded to fulfil a "cultural project"
(al-mashru' al-hadari). This cultural project, according to Rafiq Habib,
means to protect the Islamic Arabic civilization against the onslaught of
Western civilization.^
The ideological inclusiveness of the Hizb al-Wasat positioned the party
in the middle of the Egyptian political spectrum. Its programme clearly
reflected the middle class background of the younger generation active in
professional syndicates, stressing, for instance, the equality between men
and women, and accepting the right of women to hold leading positions in
society. In addition, the party held that freedom of expression should
apply to all political currents.47 Not surprisingly, the new party looked
for inspiration to the Christian Democratic Parties in Europe. Above all,
it rejected terrorism and the idea on which terrorism was based, namely
"self-righteous absolutism".48
However, neither the state nor the old leadership of the Brotherhood
were impressed by the new party. On 3 April the state arrested three
leaders of Hizb al-Wasat, together with twelve members of the
Brotherhood who did not have relations with the new party.49 It charged
the two leaders of Hizb al-Wasat with "trying to revive a secret
organisation which tries to overthrow the government by force".50 On 12
TSriq al-Bishrf's Reinterpretation of Modem Eyptian History," ed. Manfred Woidich.
Amsterdam Middle Eos! Studies, Wiesbaden, 1990 : 68-83.
46 Interview with Rafiq Habib "A Christian who takes pan in the Muslim Brotherhood,"
al-Quds al-Arabi, 17 May 1996.
47 Interview with Abu al-*Ala Madi: "We are not a party of the Muslim Brotherhood, but
our slogan is 'Islam is the solution,'"al-Wasat, No. 208,22 January 1996 : 13
48 Salim Azuzi, "Another view on the crisis of political parties and political forces in
Egypt," al-Hayat, 31 May 1996.
4'The three leaders were Abu al-'Ala Madi, Magdi Hashish, and Magdi al-Faruq. See
"Expected refusal for legalisation of Hizb al-Wasat," al-Hayat, 10 May 1996. That the
state was trying to discourage the leadership of the Brotherhood is clear from the high
positions the arrested held in society. They were a director of the Islamic Center in
Munich, an assistent professor at the Faculty of Engineering, a former member of
parliament, an assistent professor of history at the Azhar Univeristy, a high employee of
the Ministery of Education, two professors of the Faculty of Sciences at the University of
Cairo, an employee at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University,
the head of an Islamic Center in Bani Suwayf, a doctor at a hospital in Samnud. and two
businessmen. See for further details "Egypt: The military tribunal will begin shortly to
investigate the case of the Brotherhood" al-Hayat, 24 May 1996.
50 "The Muslim Brotherhood denies any relations with Hizb al-Wasat," al-Hayat, 11
April 1996. In addition they were accused of (1) founding an illegal political
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May, by the time the request for legalisation was to be dealt with by the
Committee for Political Parties, the accused were handed over by
presidential decree to a military tribunal, as had happened with Isam al-
Aryan and Abd al-Mun'im Abd al-Futuh previously.51 Under these
adverse circumstances the Committee for Political Parties rejected the
application form of the new party on 13 May.
If the leadership of the new party had accepted this defeat, the case of
Hizb al-Wasat would have ended there and the conflict with the
Brotherhood would have been papered over. But as the leaders of the new
party took up their case before the Tribunal of Parties (Mahkamat al-
Ahzab) the hidden conflict with the Brotherhood was exposed. In its
countermove the Brotherhood demanded from those members of the
society who had signed the official mandate for recognition (tawkil) to
withdraw their mandate on penalty of eviction.52 The leadership of the
Brotherhood felt threatened by the new party, which if it did acquire
legal status could have led to an exodus of the younger generation.53 Also
it could be a tool in the hands of the government to sow dissension within
the moderate Islamic movement.
In response to the threat of the old guard, only 20 members of 74
members of the Brotherhood who had given their support withdrew their
signature, leaving only a small margin for the legalisation the party - fifty
being the legal minimum for starting the procedure.54 When this became
known it immediately caused a scandal. The older members of Maktab al-
Irshad, who were not involved in the decision, accused Ma'mun al-
Hudaibi and Mustafa Mashhur, the acting leaders of the Brotherhood, of
taking unilateral action.55 The younger members, who were in Tura
prison, like Isam al-Aryan, went further, warning the leadership that they
did not feel bound by the decisions made regarding Hizb al-Wasat. At the
same time they demanded a larger degree of internal democracy.5^ The
organisation, (2) spreading literature which leads to the establishment ofthat organisation
(3) belonging to an illegal organisation (4) belonging to a secret society (the Muslim
Brotherhood), which calls for the abolition of the constitution. See al-Quds ai-Arabi, 19
April 1996
5 1 "The case of the twelve members of the 'Brotherhood ' ordered by presidential decree
to be brought before military tribunal," al-Quds al-Arabi, 13 May 1996.
5^ "The Muslim Brotherhood intends to expel founders of Hizb al-Wasat," al-Hayat, 29
May 1996.
53 'The Muslim Brotherhood is facing its worst internal crisis," al-Wasat, No. 251, 18
November 1996:24.
54 "Mustafa Mashhur: Hizb al-Wasat is a still-born baby," al-Hayat, 4 June 1996.
55 "Conflict between members of Maktab al-Irshad," al-Hayat, 8 June 1996. See also
comments by Isam Sultan in al-Hayat, 19 June 1996.
56 "The crisis within the Brotherhood is deepening. Founders of Hizb al-Wasat criticise
extent to which the crisis had gotten out of hand became especially
apparent when one of the leading Islamist thinkers of the older
generation, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, spoke out against the Brotherhood for its
course of action.
Results
By the beginning of 1997, the internal power struggle had led to some
remarkable results. Besides exposing the undemocratic procedures in the
Muslim Brotherhood, important members of the younger generation,
such as Ibrahim Bayumi Ghanim, had taken the unprecedented step of
leaving the Brotherhood for Hizb al-Wasat.57 However, perhaps one of
the most surprising results of the conflict was a report circulated by the
Brotherhood among its members explaining the grounds for rejecting the
establishment of a political party.
In this report the leadership made the difference between usul and
furu', the first meaning the principles and the latter secondary
considerations. "The usul are", according to the report, "the belief that
Islam is a complete religion covering all aspects of life (belief, rituals,
and norms and values)...the rest of the aspects of life belongs to U»furu',
among which is politics." The report went on to state that "as in principle
the derivative (al-far'a) cannot take the place of the principle (al-'asl),
this means that da'via cannot turn into a political party as long as a party
law exists which forbids the foundation of a party based on religion, and
restricts its activities to politics alone without taking into account other
aspects of life which constitute Islam."58
This document shows that the Brotherhood in crisis retreats from
hizbiyya and reverts to its former ambiguity as contained in da'wa.
Partly this the result of state repression, partly the ambivalence of the
Brotherhood itself.
al-Hudaybi," al-Hayat, 11 June 1996.
57 "The son of al-Qaradawi joins Hizb al-Wasat," al-Hayat, 29 November 1996.
Besides the son of al-Qaradawi, also the brothers of Isam al-Aryan seemed to have joined
Hizb al-Wasat, al-Hayai, 8 January 1997





The Brotherhood in Jordan has always been considered a "loyal
opposition" and has functioned as the main political and religious support
of the monarchy against its political opponents, whether in the form of
the Pan-Arab nationalists of prime minister Suiayman al-Nabulsi in the
1950s5' or the Palestinian resistence fighters during the civil war in
1970-71, or neighboring foes as Syria, As in Egypt during the 1970s and
1980s, the tacit agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood was also
directed against the radical Islamic movement. In Jordan it was the
Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) which formed the
classical radical challenge to the regime and the Brotherhood.60
However, the complete freedom the Brotherhood in Jordan enjoyed
allowed it to penetrate society to a far greater extent than in Egypt. The
democratic experiment that was initiated in Jordan in 1989 even provided
the Brotherhood with the opportunity to acquire a strong position in
parliament. The peace process on which Jordan embarked with Israel
since 1991 has brought this freedom to an end, and its seems that peace
and democracy have been two contradictory terms. But as the
Brotherhood in Jordan was already in parliament and hadbeen allowed to
pursue hizbiyya to a greater extent than the Brotherhood in Egypt, it was
easily encapsulated and rendered innocuous in parliament. In the power
struggle between state and the Islamic movement the state has greater
leverage by integrating the Brotherhood in the political system. It seems
that the strategic decision of the Brotherhood to take part in elections has
turned against it.
Licensed infiltration
At its foundation in 1945 the Brotherhood immediately acquired the
status of a charitable society (jama'iyya khayriyya) which allowed it to
play its classic role as a da'wa organisation by establishing, for instance, a
Dar al-'Ulum (teachers trainings college).*>! This meant that members of
59 Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism. Jordan 1955-
1967, Oxford, 1989 : 60-61
6°Hani Hourani, Taleb Awad, Hamcd Dabbas, Sa'eda kilan, Islamic Action Front
Parry, Amman, 1993 : 15-16
61 Zaki al-Tahla, The Political Islamic Movement in Jordan and Democracy. The
Islande Point of View, Amman (in Arabic) 1996 : 14.
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the Brotherhood could take part in elections on an individual basis in
1951 and 1954,62 a line of policy that was changed during the elections of
October 1956, when the Brotherhood won four seats as a political
party.63 However, after political parties were banned in 1957 and martial
law was established, the Brotherhood could revert to its previous
ambiguous form as a charitable society.
With the Islamic resurgence in the 1970s, the Brotherhood became
openly active again by supporting the Iranian revolution and rejecting the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a "stab in the back of the Arab and
Islamic nations".64 Although these political positions ran contrary to
those of King Hussein, the tacit alliance remained intact as was evident in
their joint support of the Syrian Brotherhood in its struggle against
president Asad at the beginning of the 1980s. Not until Jordan restored its
relations with Syria in 1985 and detained for the first time several
hundred Brothers did the modus vivendi of the previous decades come
under pressure.65
By then the Muslim Brotherhood had already acquired a considerable
stake in Jordanian society. Its status as a charitable organisation had
enabled the Brotherhood to infiltrate many official institutions. Most
conspicuously, it has brought the Ministries of Education and Awqaf
under its control, and traditionally provides the General Secretary of the
Ministry of Education. The Brotherhood's power in these institutions is
illustrated by the appointment of one of the Brotherhood's leaders as
minister of Education in 1970, while another, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat,
became Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament in 1989-1993, after
having been Secretary General of the Ministry of Education from 1982 to
1985.66
The Brotherhood and the Islamic movement has also infiltrated civil
society. In the more traditional field of da'wa the Brotherhood built a
network of mosques throughout the country, while in the more modem
field, like the universities, the Islamic groups gained a majority in the
student unions on the campuses of universities of Amman and Yarmouk
in the 1980s.67 As in Egypt the younger generation of members of the
Islamic movement established strong positions in the professional
62 Islamic Action Front Parry : 11.
63 Zaki al-Tahla (1996) : 16
64 Roben B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank. Challenges to the Domestic
Stability of Jordan, Washington, 1986 : 41
65Kathrine Rath, "The Process of Democratization in Jordan," Middle Eastern Studies,
30 (1994) 3 : 546.
66 Islamic Action Front Party : 13-14.
67 Satloff (1986): 45
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organisations. In 1996 six of the twelve professional associations were in
the hands of the Islamic movement, among which the Engineers, the
doctors, and pharmacist associations.68
Islamic Action Front
In this situation Jordan embarked on its highly interesting democratic
experiment. The immediate reason for terminating a 22 year period of
martial law was the food riots in Ma'an in April 1989. In its choice
between further repression, or democratization and the inclusion of the
population in the political process, King Hussein chose for the latter. On
8 November 1989 for the first time since 1956 free elections were held,
while a National Charter was announced for 1991 in order to secure the
new relationship between government and citizens.
The Brotherhood fully accepted the challenge and threw its full force
in the election campaign. The strength of the Muslim Brotherhood during
the elections was reflected in the fact that it was the only political
organisation to present a list on a nation-wide basis.69 The Islamist
candidates won 34 out of 80 seats in parliament. The Muslim
Brotherhood had 20 of its 26 candidates elected. The remaining 14 seats
were won by independent Islamists.7"
The second Gulf war of 1990-1991 further enhanced the position of
the Brotherhood, as both Hussein and the Islamic movement supported
Saddam Hussein. A National Front was formed which consisted of all
secular as well as religious forces in parliament, and on 1 January 1991
the government announced a new cabinet in which the Muslim
Brotherhood was represented. It was clear that the democratic experiment
and the popularity of the Islamic movement, had forced the king to
include the Brotherhood into the center of power. Characteristically, the
Brotherhood demanded the 'ideological ministries' of Social
Development, Education and Religious Affairs.71
The first signs of strain became apparent only after the opening of the
Madrid Peace conference. On 17 June 1991 King Husain dismissed the
cabinet and appointed Tahir al-Masri prime minister, a Palestinian who
favored a negotiated peace with Israel. On 18 June the Brotherhood
68 Raed al-Abed, "Government's 30-year-old Nuisance," The Star, 1996 (April, no
exact date).
69 Kamel S. Abu Jaber anti Schirin H. Fathi, "The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary
Elections," Orient 31 (1990) 1 :77.
70 Katherine Rath (1994) : 545.
7! Beverley Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic
Response in Jordan," In Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James
Piscatori, Chicago, 1991 : 88-108.
17
leader Abd al-Rahman Khalifa stated: "We will not participate in any
government that will negotiate with Israel or with its American
partner."72
Aware of the threat the Muslim Brotherhood posed to the peace
process, the government first tried to contain the Islamic movement
through democratic means. The adoption of the National Charter in June
1991 was partly intended to circumscribe the power of the Islamists by
encouraging the secular opposition to organize itself. The Charter
allowed for a multi-party system, political pluralism, the establishment of
political parties, and increased press freedom, elements which in
themselves were assumed to undermine the position of the Brotherhood in
societyJ3 In fulfilment of the National Charter, a law was adopted
allowing the establishment of political parties in August 1992.
The Brotherhood's reaction was to follow the trend and fully accept
the democratic rules. The Brotherhood embraced the principle of
hizbiyya openly by establishing the Islamic Action Front (IAF; Hizb
Jabha al-'Amal al-lslami). Nevertheless, it retained its character as a
da'wa organisation by establishing the IAF as a separate political
organisation which in principle was to function as an umbrella for all
Islamist currents in Jordan.
Unsure of the effects the democratic measures would produce on the
Islamic movement, the government finally resorted to more devious
means to stem its rise. In August 1993 a new electoral law was introduced
which substituted the bloc-voting system by a one-man one-vote system.
This law was generally regarded as a means to curb the Islamic
movement, because it rightly assumed that people would give their single
vote to those candidates on whom they were dependent, whereas
previously they could divide their numerous votes between different
candidates. Within a largely tribal society, this system privileged the
tribal elders.'4
Other restrictive measures during the election campaign further
hampered the Muslim Brotherhood in achieving a victory. In order not to
provoke the government, the Muslim Brotherhood was cautious enough
not to field more than 36 candidates - less than half the seats.75 In the end
the IAF, won only 16, the independents 2 seats. As was intended, a vast
72 Beverley Milton-Edwards (1991) : 106.
73 Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Façade Democracy and Jordan," British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (1993) 2 : 198.
74 Frédéric Charillon and Alain Mouftard, "Jordanie: Les élections du 8 novembre 1993
et le processus de paix," Machreb Machrek 144 (1994) : 45.
75 "Lacklustre campaign," Middle East International, 5 November 1993 : 11.
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majority of the seats went to tribal representatives.76
Restrictions
As the opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood against the peace process
increased after the Oslo Accords of September 1993, measures against it
were stepped up. The party law of August 1992 had already stipulated
that for security reasons it was forbidden for parties to have ties with
foreign countries, a clear hint to the pan-Islamist Brotherhood.77 In the
same vein press freedom was curtailed when in December 1993 a law was
adopted in parliament which banned publication of items that could "harm
the king or members of the royal family," damage "national unity", or
undermine "public ethics."78 Increasingly more subjects were deemed
outside the purview of the press. Especially the combination between
religion and politics was condemned and imams were advised "to leave
politics outside the houses of worship".7?
After the Washington Declaration of 15 July 1994 and the signing of
the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel on 26 October in the same
year it became increasingly clear that democracy and the peace process
were incompatible. Parliament was neither consulted nor asked to ratify
both documents until well after their signing.80 The pre-democratic
authoritarianism of the monarchy was reasserted when the king claimed
the peace policy was his personal responsibility,81 while any critique was
suppressed by portraying the peace process as a national goal.82
When the king insisted on "normalisation" of relations with Israel
prior to a comprehensive peace treaty and the complete retreat of Israeli
troops from occupied territory, the opposition against the treaty extended
beyond the Islamic movement and included several established politicians
on whom the monarchy had relied in the past, such as Tahir al-Masri and
Ahmad Ubaidat.83 The sensitivity of the monarchy to criticism was
especially shown during the assassination of the Israeli prime minister
Rabin on 4 November 1995. While king Husssein mourned over a
76 Schirin H. Fathi, Jordan art Invented Nation? Hamburg, 1994 : 202-210.
77 "Now for liberalisation," Middle East International, 7 August 1992 :11.
78 "Set-back for the king's vision," Middle East International !8 December 1992 : 11.
?9 "King Hussein plays the waiting game," Middle East International, 5 November
1993 : 18.
80 "Political confusion," Middle East International, 9 September 1994 : 8.
81 Mark Power-Stevens, "Jordan and the question of peace," Middle East
International, 23 September 1994 : 15.
%2 "Jordan and the question of peace," Middle East international 23 September 1994 :
16.
83 "Hussein's toughest dilemma," Middle East International, 26 May 1995 :7.
"brother, friend and partner", an Islamist paper gloated over his death,
describing Rabin as "one murderer less". Referring to a "degraded and
degrading press" the government announced further measures to curb the
right of the press to "cross red lines, destroy national unity and
undermine the achievements of Jordan."84
The IAF has not been able yet to find an answer to these repressive
measures. Having chosen for hizbiyya it is hamstrung in parliament
where it is under the tutelage and the authoritarian paternalism of the
king. The opposition to the peace process has been limited and ineffective
because it was not able to voice its opposition. For its half-hearted
position and internal squables it has lost much of its initial popularity,
while it has not gained any compensation of power in parliament. For
instance, the Brotherhood was denied the right as the largest political
party to provide the Speaker for the yearly session of parliament in
1995.85 Its protests against the restrictions on civil society were
ignored.86
Independent Islamists
Because on the whole the Muslim Brotherhood has remained loyal to the
king and has been largely coopted into the 'democratic' system, legal
oppositional Islamic currents have manifested themselves since the 1980s
outside the Brotherhood as independents. The independent Islamists in
Jordan show similarities with members of Hizb al-Wasat and the third
generation members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Both belong to
the younger generation of Islamists which led the Islamic resurgence at
the universities in the 1970s; both are also conspicuous for their presence
in the elite professional organisations, and both seem to be taking the
brunt of state repression in the 1990s. These young independent Islamists
in particular have not only shown the limits of the democracy of the state,
but also the limits of the democratic procedures within the Islamic
movement itself.87
Although the government has so far not repressed the Islamist
opposition, as is the case in Egypt, it nevertheless has persecuted the more
radical Islamist dissidents as a way to set an example. The most prominent
dissident is undoubtedly Laith Shubailat. Elected as independent Islamist
84 "Caught between two moods," Middle East International, 17 November 1995 : 8.
85 "King Hussein's speech from the throne," al-Hayat, 1 December 1995.
86 "National Association of Journalists rejects changes in press law," al-Hayat, 5
December 1995
^7 See for an analysis of the role of the Islamist independents: Beverley Milton-Edwards,
"Climate of Change in Jordan's Islamist Movement," in Islamic Fundamentalism, eds.
Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Boulder, 1996 : 123-142
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in parliament in 1984 and 1989, he has lately been reelected president of
the Engineers Organisation of Jordan. Persecution of Shubailat started in
the summer of 1992, when he and Ya'qub Qarrash, an independent
Palestinian Islamist in parliament, who led the investigation in the
corruption case against former prime minister Zaid Rifai, were arrested
and put on trial before a military court on suspicion of being members of
a militant terrorist group called Shabab al-Nafir al-Islami (Youth of the
Muslim Herald).88 In a clear warning to the Islamist movement, they
were sentenced to twenty years in prison, only to be amnestied 48 hours
later by King Hussein. Characteristically, King Hussein warned the
Islamist movement that he would fight against "renegades" and the
"ambitious", as well as "anyone who dares to threaten democracy., or
exploit freedom with the aim of subverting it."89
However, his opposition against the government did not end. In 1993
Laith Shubailat boycotted the elections, protesting against the new
electoral law.90 In December 1995 he was again arrested, this time on
charges of slandering the king (lèse majesté).91 In a speech given in
Irbid he stated that "his Majesty the King and the government had worked
on Zionising Jordan."92 Again he was brought before a military tribunal
and sentenced to three years in prison. The outcry by the opposition
parties against his arrest was instantaneous and widespread.93 in
November 1996 King Hussein personally fetched him from prison.94
Although independents probe the outer limits of tolerance of the state
for criticism, which has decreased since the peace treaty, the regime is
relatively mild, amnestying its prisoners regularly. Even when Laith
Shubailat was on trial he was allowed to stand for elections for the
presidency of the Engineers Organisations in February 1996, which he
won with a large majority.55
Also in respect of the democratic content of the larger Islamic
88 "Concerns over the future," Middle East International, 11 September 1992 : 14; and
"Lamis Andoni, "Jordan and Palestine: debating the future relationship," Middle East
International, 23 October 1992 : 6.
89 "The king's pardon," Middle East International, 20 November 1992 : 14.
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91 "In the thick of it," Middle East International, 15 December 1995 : 10.
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movement the independents are illustrative. Originally, the Islamic Action
Front was established to mobilise all Islamic forces in the country.
However, it quickly became clear that it was a front for the Brotherhood.
When the 120 members of the consultative council conatained only 18
independents, they resigned because they felt they "were rowing on a




Hamas (acronym of the Movement of Islamic Resistence: Harakat al-
Muqawama al-lslamiyya) was founded by the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood and is the largest Islamist Palestinian organisation.^? As the
Brotherhood's struggle was not directed primarily against the Israeli
occupation but fell within the classic pattern of da'wa and was as such
aimed at the "founding of the Islamic personality" and opposed to the
"atheist" PLO, it was allowed by the Israeli authorities to acquire a hold
over Palestinian civil society,98 During the intifada in 1988 the quietist
attitude of the Brotherhood changed and it launched Hamas under the
slogan "Palestine from the river to the sea (min at-nahr li-l-bahr) is a holy
trust afforded to Muslims by God."99 According to this concept the
signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 amounted to sacrilege.
The coming of the PNA in May 1994 to Gaza and Jericho inaugurated,
however, a new phase in the relationship with Hamas. If a Palestinian
civil war was to be avoided and the peace process was to be saved, a
agreement in which Hamas would accept 'Oslo'was imperative.
The relationship between Hamas and the PNA depended since May
1994 for a large part on the attitude of Hamas toward the elections of the
first Palestinian council to be held in January 1996. By accepting the
96Beverky Milton-Edwards (1996) : 135
97 Jean François Legrain, "The Islamic Movement and the Intifada," eds. J.R. Wasser
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22
elections Hamas would automatically acknowledge 'Oslo' and be included
in the structures of the new Palestinian state. In contrast to the
Brotherhood in other countries, Hamas' dilemma was not between da'wa
and hizbiyya, but rather between hizbiyya ana jihad, as it included within
its ranks all shades of the moderate and radical Islamic movement.
Participation in the elections proved the divisive issue between moderates
and hardliners. This division also coincided to a large degree with
'insiders', leaders in Gaza and the West Bank, and 'outsiders', the more
radical representatives of Hamas in its offices in Amman, Teheran and
Khartoum.
Already in October 1993 shaikh Yassin, the jailed founder of Hamas,
opened the internal struggle by stating why Hamas should take part in the
coming elections: "because it wants to have influence on the daily lives of
the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories."100 The subsequent bomb
attacks against Israel by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, however,
terminated the process of integration. In October 1994 Hamas killed 25
Israelis, injuring another 50. In 1995 others waves of violence followed,
the worst one perpetrated in July. As a result, attempts by the moderate
wing of Hamas to become incorporated into the emerging political system
and establish a political party along the lines of the Jordanian Islamic
Action Front were undermined. The hardliners were well aware that
incorporation into the PNA system could spell the end of the raison
d'être of Hamas. As with the IAF, incorporation entailed the danger of
compromise, subjection and loss of credibility, as well as, possibly, the
ultimate demise of the Islamic movement. On account of the impasse of
the peace process a rejectionist jihadist attitude could count on a large
popularity.
Hamas' dilemma
The PNA reacted to the disturbances of its relations with Israel in 1995
by clamping down on Hamas. In April it arrested more than 150
members of Hamas, closed down its newspaper al-Watan, and arrested its
editor-in-chief, Imad al-Faluji as well as its director Sayyid Abu
Masamih. The response by the 'radical' Hamas spokesman in Jordan,
Ibrahim Ghausha was predictable: "In the period in which the PNA is
completely taken in by the Zionist occupation, it executes its will by
arresting the members and leaders of the Islamic movement." Also the
Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) protested that "the only one who
will benefit from these measures is the Zionist enemy." It accused the
100 Graham Usher (1995, a) : 29.
PNA of being anti-nationalist.10' The typical reposte of Arafat was that
"the peace accords had been signed by the PLO as the only representative
of the Palestinians and that all [Palestinian] organisations must respect
it."102 Taking its cue from the surrounding authoritarian states, the PNA
trials took place in military courts on charges of sedition. For instance,
Sayyid Abu Masamih, director of al-Watan, was sentenced to two years
in prison on the charges of "violating the freedom of speech and writing
seditious pamphlets."1^3
In the subsequent months Hamas pursued a dualistic tactic in order to
avoid a total confrontation with the PNA as well as regain its internal
unity and its credibility with the Palestinian population. While offering to
hold a "full" and "open" dialogue with the PNA it tried to make as little
concessions as possible.1"4 In the meantime it was apparent that within
Hamas the conflict about strategy had been intensified as a result of the
crack down. The moderate wing was in favor of forswearing the armed
struggle and establishing a political party to take part in the elections. The
hardliners rejected any change in policy, but upheld the principle of
negotiations with the PNA, if only for tactical reasons to gain time and
rebuild the organisation. The bomb attack on 24 July on Ramat Gan
meant a temporary setback for the moderates. Consequently, leaders of
Hamas, such as Mahmud al-Zahhar, shaikh Ahmad Bahar, and shaikh
Muhsan Abu Mu'ti were arrested again.l°5 The fact, however, that Hamas
did not claim the attack indicated that the moderates had gained the upper
hand. 106
By the time the leadership was gradually released in October, the
situation had changed drastically in favor of Arafat and the PNA.107 The
Taba Agreement - Oslo II - had finally given the peace process a
momentum, and the provisions of the agreement - evacuation of Israeli
troops from the major Palestinian towns on the West Bank, scheduled
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elections of a Palestinian parliament and presidential elections for 20 of
January - gave Arafat the initiative back and offered him the opportunity
to reestablish his legitimacy. The pressure on Hamas to decide whether to
take part in the elections therefore mounted and resulted in widespread
confusion and contradictory statements. For instance, while the
spokesman for Hamas in Gaza, Mahmud al-Zahhar, said no decision had
been taken on participating in the elections and renouncing violence, Imad
al-Faluji, announced that "the decision to found a political party had
already been taken."108
The internal confusion did not end until an intensive campaign was
initiated to bring the moderates and hardliners into line. Three moderates
of Hamas with close ties to Arafat, Khalid al-Hini, Abdallah Manama and
Sa'id al-Nimruti, took the initiative to mediate in August. They involved
Hasan al-Turabi, the Sudanese Islamist leader, in the reconciliation
attempt and on 4 October the first meeting was held between the
mediators and representatives of the outsiders in Khartoum. The
announcement made at the end of the meeting - that "we regard military
action as a strategic means to liberate Palestine" - indicated that the
hardliners won the internal struggle.1*® Consequently, some moderates as
Imad al-Faluji who had collaborated too closely with the PNA were
thrown out of Hamas, and the discussion about the political party of
Hamas, Hizb al-Khallas al-lslami, was scuttled.110
The success of the hardliners seemed to be confirmed during the
negotiations between Hamas and the PNA from 20 to 23 December in
Cairo. The second meeting had taken place in Khartoum, but this time it
included the full delegation of the 'insiders' as well as the 'outsiders'.111
At the end of the negotiations Hamas announced that it would not
renounce the armed struggle and that it would not take part in the
elections. Despite these setbacks, the spokesman for the PNA said that the
negotiations had been a "success for sixty percent".112 The positive
10* Interview with Mahmud al-Zahhar: "Hamas wil not change into a political party," al-
Hayat, 20 October 1995; Interview with Imad al-Faluji: "PNA and Hamas have made
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results were that both parties agreed that internal conflicts in future
would be resolved "peacefully", "national unity" would be upheld and
"pluralism" would be recognized. Perhaps more significantly, Hamas
acknowledged in principle that "it would do nothing to harm the interests
of the PNA." It promised to refrain from armed attacks on Israeli targets
for the duration of the coming elections.!13
That an accommodation had been reached was indeed borne out by the
elections of 20 January. Although several candidates of Hamas who had
registered themselves - such as the three mediators mentioned previously
- were pressured to withdraw, on the whole Hamas did not obstruct the
elections. From all appearances it was divided in its attitude towards the
elections. In the districts where the moderates predominated, the
following of Hamas was advised to vote for independent Islamist
candidates who were sympathetic towards Hamas. In these districts, such
as Nablus, Gaza, Gaza City, and North Gaza, the turnout of voters was
relatively high. In total, sympathizers with Hamas won seven out of the
88 seats of the Palestinian parliament.114 Opinion polls indicated that half
of the supporters of Hamas went to the polls.115 Arafat was therefore
justified to state triumphantly that Hamas had in fact participated in the
elections.116 In acknowledgement of its good behavior the PNA allowed
Hamas to open an official party bureau in Gaza City on 28 of January.11'
The subsequent bomb attacks on 25 February and 3 and 4 March
reversed this process drastically. The moderate leadership - the 'insiders'
- condemned these assaults explicitly as senseless and as opposed to the
interests of the Palestinian people. Abu Masamih stated that "we have a
clear position that the killing of civilians is prohibited."118 Moderate
leaders called for an end to violent attacks on several occassions.11^
!i3 "Dialogue in Cairo (between PNA anil Hamas): positive results, but what
afterwards?" al-Hayat, 4 January 1996.
U4 "Palestinian elections, the passing of the democratic test," al-Wasat, No. 209, 29
January 1996 : 28-31. See for the end results al-Hayat, 24 January 1996.
^5 "Majority of Palestinians does not give mandate to Arafat without restrictions," al-
Hayat, 24 January 1996.
11° Interview with Arafat: "Hamas has not boycotted the elections," al-Hayat, 6
February 1996.
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Although the reason given for the bomb attacks was the assassination of
Yahya Ayyash, the leader of the Izz al-Din Qassam brigades, in Gaza on 5
January by the Israelis, it is clear that the attacks also had the purpose to
undermine the integration of the moderate wing of Hamas into the PNA
state structure. The attack in Jerusalem and Ashkalon had been executed
by Muhyi al-Din al-Sharif a 28 year old electrician from Hebron who had
played an intermediairy role between al-Ayyash and perpetrators of two
attacks on 21 August in Jerusalem (four dead) and in the Tel Aviv suburb
of Ramat Can on 24 July (six dead).120 The attack on 3 March had been
executed by Isam Muhammad Abduh, a student from Bir Zeit university.
Both members came from Hebron and were members of the "cell of
Yahya Ayyash", which was a continuation of Yahya Ayyash wing of the
Izz al-Din Qassam brigades. This organisation had split off from the Gaza
military wing of the Izz al-Din Qassam brigades which abided by the
cease fire and followed the more moderate line of the Hamas leadership
in Gaza.
The unilateral action of this splinter group made it clear that the
radicals were able to use the divisions within Hamas for their purposes.
According to Shaikh Taisir al-Tamimi, "it is known that the military arm
of Hamas does not take its orders from the political wing."121 In an
interview with al-Quds al-Arabi the Speaker of the Palestinian parliament
Salim Za'nun, said that there was not one but many Hamas organisations
(Hamasât). He was convinced that the Hamas leadership in Gaza under
Mahmud al-Zahhar did not have any control over the "cell of Yahya al-
Ayyash" and that it had been set up and run by the 'outsiders'. The fact
that it had its base in the refugee camp al-Fawwar at Hebron confirms
this.122
The bomb attacks severely damaged and weakened Hamas. After the
bomb attacks the PNA and the Israelis clamped down on Hamas. The full
force of repression could now be used, as Arafat was at the height of his
popularity after the evacuation of Israeli troops from the major cities on
the West Bank and the success of the elections for the Legislative Council.
The PNA's purpose was not to fully repress Hamas, an unattainable goal,
but merely to suppress its radical wing and to set up Hamas stooges.
120 "Israel announces plan for bomb attacks; PNA arrests tens of members of Hamas in
Gaza," al-Hayai, 27 February 1996.
12' "The assault in Jerusalem confirms the existence of divisions inside Hamas," al-
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members of the PNA," al-Hayat, 18 May 1996.
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As part of this strategy Arafat declared the "underground organisation
of Hamas" outside the law. Many institutions of Hamas were closed. PNA
arrested 60 members of Hamas in Gaza after the first attack only to arrest
another 140 after the March assault, among whom most of its leaders. In
total 1,200 members of Hamas were arrested. The Islamic University of
Gaza was raided, and the Ministry of Awqaf extended its control over
mosques which had formerly been run by Hamas. Close associates of the
attack in Ashkelon and Jerusalem on 25 February were sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Those leaders who were not imprisoned and allowed to talk freely,
were staunch moderates such as Mahmud al-Zahhar (Gaza) and shaikh
Jumai! Hamami (West Bank).123 Their claim to speak for Hamas, could
easily be denied by more radical outsiders such as Ibrahim Ghausha in
Jordan who stated that al-Zahhar spoke only for himself.124 In this light
the foundation, finally, of the political party of Hamas, Hizb al-Khallas al-
Watani, at the end of March 1996, was somewhat artificial, especially
since Arafat was willing to let a few of its members enter the cabinet if
they foreswore the use of violence.125 From later pronouncements it
appeared that the party's relations with Hamas were still unclear and that
it "hoped" to be the political wing of Hamas.126 Other leaders denied that
Hamas had established a party.127
Hamas on the rebound
Despite repressive measures to make Hamas innocuous, it has not been
eliminated, neither has it been intimidated into falling in line and been
integrated. As long as the Israeli intransigence continues and Hamas has
not reneged on its basic ideological point that Israel will never give
Palestinians their rights, the star of Hamas will be on the horizon. The
election of Netanyahu in May 1996 has improved the prospects of Hamas.
Temporary rises in Arafat's popularity at the end of September 1996,
during the mini intifada of the 'tunnel crisis', do not seem to have made
any difference. The prolonged negotiations over Hebron and the
announcement of the building of settlements at Har Homa in Jerusalem
made his popularity plummet again and led to deep disillusionment with
the Oslo Accords.
123 "Leadership of Hamas recognizes limited splits," al-Hayat, 31 May 1996.
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28
The popularity of Hamas is especially conspicuous in the election
results of student unions and professional organisations. As recently after
the bombings in May 1996, Hamas won 23 of the 51 seats of the student
union at Bir Zeit, while Fatah won only 17 seats.128 On 11 December
Hamas staged a massive rally in Khan Yunis in Gaza to mark the first
anniversary of the death of Yahya Ayyash which 40,000 people attended.
Hamas leader Abd al-Fattah Dukhkhan reiterated that "peace has not
realized our minimum rights, and we do not agree with Oslo because a
peace that is not based on justice will not be a success."12' On 31 March
the pro-Hamas Islamic Bloc won the student election at the Polytechnic
Institute, winning 19 of the 31 seats, on the same day it won 5 out of 9
seats of the Employees Union election at Najah University in Nablus,
while on 29 March it won 9 out of 12 seats in the Engineers Association
in the Gaza Strip.'30
Besides banking on the failure of the peace process, Hamas seems to
have learned its lesson and has become more disciplined. At the rally in
Khan Yunis it hung Arafat's portrait alongside those of leaders of Hamas.
Also Hamas has been able to rebuild its organisation after the PNA was
forced to release most of the detainees as a sign of goodwill because no
further bombings had taken place. It was announced that it would elect a
executive committee to assert the unity of the organisation.131 The bomb
attack in Tel Aviv on 21 March 1997 was not claimed by 'insiders' as
well as 'outsiders' of Hamas.132 It appears that Hamas has successfully
evaded the trap of the elections and has not closed its options which were
restricted by hizbiyya.
Conclusion
From the above it is clear that the strategic choice of the 'moderate'
Islamic movement to adopt hizbiyya as opposed to its classic stance of
da'wa is based on the estimations of its chances of gaining power. As has
been shown, taking the step to a more open form of political participation
entails serious risks. In Egypt the transition of the Brotherhood from
da'wa to hizbiyya was made in the 1980s when the state and the
Brotherhood struck a modus vivendi with the state. Despite this working
relationship the Brotherhood expanded its activities much faster and more
128 'The Islamic iist wins the Palestinian student elections at Bir Zeis," al-Quds al-Arabi,
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determined than the ruling elite would tolerate. Especially the following
it acquired among the younger generation of the Islamic movement and
the role this generation acquired within the professional organisations
posed a threat to the authority of the state. Ironically this new generation
also threatened the hegemony of the older generation of the Brotherhood.
Eventually the conflict led to a split in the Brotherhood and the
foundation of the party Hizb al-Wasat early 1996. The younger
generation showed with Hizb al-Wasat the limits of democracy within the
moderate Islamic movement, while rt at same time it experienced the full
force of the repression of the state which tried to set this generation as an
example. In the end hizbiyya did not pay off.
In Jordan the relationship between state and Islamic movement evolved
into the complete opposite of Egypt. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
had always been part of the 'loyal opposition' and until the 1980s was one
of the main political supports of the monarchy. Although the excellent
relationship turned sour at the end of the 1980s, the Brotherhood was still
able to take advantage of the démocratisation process which was initiated
in 1989. It was only when the peace process started in earnest after the
Oslo Accords in 1993 that relations between the monarchy and the
Muslim Brotherhood deteriorated rapidly. Hamstrung by its commitment
to hizbiyya, the political wing of the Brotherhood, the Islamic Action
Front (IAF), lost much of its credibility. In contrast, the more flexible
Islamist independents were able to gain adherents by their more
oppositional role.
In Palestine integration also centred around the issue of peace.
However, Hamas has so far succeeded in not becoming coopted into the
system. Since it was established in May 1994, the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) has tried its utmost to integrate Hamas into the political
system and force it to accept 'Oslo' through participation in the elections
for the Legislative Council in January 1996. The extreme tension this
dilemma posed for Hamas - between influencing events from inside the
system or standing aloof and retaining purity - almost tore Hamas apart
between outsiders and insiders, moderates and radicals. After the almost
total repression which followed the suicide bombings in February/March
1996, Hamas seems to have regained its former strength and can profit
from the contempt with which Irsaeli prime minister Netanyahu has
treated the peace process. Not having accepted hizbiyya, Hamas kept its
options open by retaining its independence and not letting itself be
trapped by 'democratization' abd incorporation.
Developments in the future are difficult to fathom. Two preconditions
must be met for a democratic transition to take place. Firstly the political
circumstances in which Islamic movements operate must be more
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conducive for an adoption of democratic prinicples. Secondly, the Islamic
movement itself must be committed to hizbiyya. Pious intellectual
treatises on democracy are not enough. Reform of the internal structures
of moderate Islamic movements is necessary.
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